HIT and brain reward function: a case of mistaken identity (theory) by Wright, Cory et al.
HIT and brain reward function: A case of mistaken identity (theory)
Cory Wright a,*, Matteo Colombo b, Alexander Beard a
aDepartment of Philosophy, California State University Long Beach, 1250 Bellﬂower Boulevard, Long Beach, CA 90840e2408, United States of America
b Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics, & Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 19 August 2016
Received in revised form
3 April 2017
Available online 28 June 2017
Keywords:
Dopamine
Explanation
Identity
Localization
Mechanism
Reward
a b s t r a c t
This paper employs a case study from the history of neurosciencedbrain reward functiondto scrutinize
the inductive argument for the so-called ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ (HIT). The case fails to support HIT,
illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold
under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims
presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alter-
native to the traditional identity theory so much as a relabeling of previously discussed strategies for
mechanistic discovery.
! 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
The central thesis of the mind/brain identity theory is that every
type of mental state or process is identical with some type of brain
state or process. Early proponents of the theory intended to rebut
two general claims: that mental states and processes are something
other than brain states and processes, and that mental states are
merely correlated with brain states.1 Later proponents of the theory
intended to enshrine a few further theoretical commitments: that
kinds of mental states and processes are reducible without
remainder to certain kinds of states and processes in the brain; that
the identity relation involved in mind/brain identity statements is
necessary; and that mind/brain identity statements are neither
analytic nor a priori.
Sadly, the identity theory fell on hard times. From the early
1960s to the late 1980s, it was beleaguered by numerous philo-
sophical challenges, including concerns over multiple realizability,
violations of Leibniz’s law and the modal logic of identity state-
ments, and the apparent incorrigibility of introspective reports.2
Since the early 1990s, examinations of case studies and actual sci-
entiﬁc practice have become equally important prongs in both
challenges to, and defenses of, philosophical theses about mind/
brain relationships (Bickle, 2003); but unfortunately, traditional
identity theorists have had a paucity of cases of psychoneural
identities to celebrate.
These challenges have created the conditions for an alternative
to the traditional identity theory, dubbed the ‘Heuristic Identity
Theory’ (HIT). The traditional theory supposes that scientists work
by generating psychoneural correlations and then accumulating
evidence for type-identities to explain them. According to HIT, this
supposition puts the cart before the horse. Psychoneural identities
are not discovered after a period of protracted scientiﬁc research;
instead, scientists intrepidly hypothesize them at the outset of in-
quiry and then use those hypotheses as a discovery heuristic for
driving further research.
Interest in HIT has coincided with other favored philosophical
trends, including the recrimination of reductionist themes in the
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psychological sciences, the rise of explanatory pluralism, and the
mechanistic approach to explanation (McCauley, 1996). Embracing
pluralism and mechanistic explanation in particular (e.g., Bechtel &
Wright, 2009), advocates of HIT have appealed to a few cases from
neuroscientiﬁc practice to support the claim that ‘hypothetical
identities [.] regularly serve as the critical premises in explanatory
proposals that inaugurate new lines of scientiﬁc investigation’
(McCauley, 2012: 192).
This paper examines this claim, asking two questions. Has HIT
received sufﬁciently convincing empirical support? Is HIT a genuine
alternative to the traditional identity theory?
To answer these questions, we shall proceed as follows. In x2, we
survey HIT’s basic commitments. In x3, we detail the history of
electrophysiological and neuropharmacological research on brain
reward function (BRF), which provides an exemplary case study
against which to test the predictions and commitments of HIT.
Unexpectedly, this case failed to support HIT, motivating closer
scrutiny of previously invoked cases. In x4, we argue that, on a
standard conception of identity, these previous cases also fail to
provide convincing empirical support for HIT; on a broader
conception of identity, existing case studies do support HIT, but not
as a version of identity theory, as advocates present it.
Philosophical attempts to detail the claims of HIT have only
supported a broadly mechanistic approach to mechanistic expla-
nation and mechanism discovery, which often posits hypotheses
about the localization of psychological functions in the brain, or
hypotheses about the causal production of psychological phe-
nomena by certain neural mechanisms. While scientists often
advance such hypotheses as heuristics for discovering mechanisms
(Bechtel & Richardson, 1993/2010), it is a mistake to confuse these
relations for the identity relation. As it is not a theory about iden-
tity, HIT is not any kind of mind/brain identity theory. In particular,
HIT is not a new alternative identity theory so much as an epicycle
on what has been called the ‘new mechanical philosophy’ in
cognitive neuroscience. We consider various additional conceptual
problems in xx5e6, and conclude in x7.
2. Heuristic identity theory
2.1. Origination
HIT seems to have originated from remarks by William
Wimsatt (1976a: 227e229), who suggested that explanationdnot
reductiondis the proper context in which to understand the role
of psychoneural identities in science. For Wimsatt, identities are
not the endpoint or goal of an intertheoretic reduction, and they
do not serve as a regulative ideal against which intertheoretical
relations are formally judged. Rather, they are ‘tools’ used pri-
marily to ferret out errors, and thus play a merely enabling role
upstream in the process of reﬁning explanations: ‘[i]dentity claims
[.] provide probes of potentially unlimited sensitivity and depth
for pinpointing sources of explanatory failures’ (1976a: 227).
Wimsatt’s remarks were later reformulated, en passant, by Robert
McCauley:
Instead of identities being assigned late in the game to those
coextensionalities which prove persistently recalcitrant to
explanation, they are often proposed relatively early, initiating
wholly new lines of research. When in doubt (many scientists)
assume the truth of a proposed identity until empirical research
clearly indicates otherwise. The postulation of identities is a
research tool for extending the explanatory range of theories.
They are not proposed as the grounds for justifying eliminative
moves in microreductions (even if, after the fact, they may be
cited as such). (1981: 225)
Unfortunately, HIT went dark after these two opening salvos,
but was resurrected in a series of papers by McCauley & William
Bechtel.3
From this body of work emerged the central thesis of HIT:
identity statements are discovery heuristics.4 Bechtel & McCauley
put the thesis this way: ‘claims between psychological processes
and neural mechanisms [sic] are advanced as heuristics that serve
to guide further research’ (1999: 71). The thought is that identity
statements play a heuristic role in the initial development and
guidance of research in multiple ﬁelds and at multiple levels of
analysis: ‘identity claims are made early in a research program and
serve as heuristic for further research’ (Bechtel, 2002: 236).
The process of advancing heuristic identities has multiple pha-
ses, which McCauley & Bechtel (2001: 751) described as follows.
Initially, identity statements involve discrepancies. These discrep-
ancies prompt further research at various levels of analysis to
ascertain which proposals should prevail or in which directions to
proceed. Next, this further research yields more precise hypotheses
about the systems and patterns engaged, provoking new specula-
tions at multiple explanatory levels. Then, speculations imply new
ways of orchestrating familiar facts and theories within levels, and
suggest new avenues of research. Finally, some of these avenues of
research produce new cross-scientiﬁc conﬂicts, which likely begin
this cycle anew.
So, in positing identities betweenmental states or processes and
neural states or processes, scientists can apply knowledge of neural
mechanisms to guide the development of models of mental states
and processes at higher levels of analysis; and then they can
justiﬁably rely on knowledge of mental states and processes to
search for lower-level neural mechanisms. As McCauley & Bechtel
put it, ‘what we learn about an entity or process under one
description should apply to it under its other descriptions’ (2001:
753), which Bechtel repeats elsewhere: ‘[. u]nlike [the] traditional
identity theory, the focus is on using the differences between what
is known about the processes under each description as a discovery
heuristic to revise the other’ (2008a: 990). For advocates of HIT,
what ultimately matters is the explosive amount of science that can
be generated by positing identities. If psychoneural identities play
this roledfecunditydin scientiﬁc practice, then HIT would rest
vindicated in a way that eschews the metaphysical issues raised by
traditional versions of identity theory.
2.2. Three overarching commitments
The thesis that identity statements are discovery heuristics is
analyzable into at least three successive commitments. Firstly,
identity statements are ‘thoroughly hypothetical’ statements about
psychoneural relations (Bechtel & McCauley, 1999: 67, 71). Sec-
ondly, these hypothetical identity statements are posited at the
outset of a period of scientiﬁc research. As Bechtel & McCauley
wrote, ‘scientists adopt [identity statements] as hypotheses in the
course of empirical investigation to guide subsequent inquiry,
rather than settling on them merely as the results of such inquiry’
(1999: 67; see also Bechtel, 2002: 236), and again, ‘[i]dentity claims
(e.g., that water is H2O or pain is C-ﬁber ﬁring) are [.] made at the
outset of investigation, often on the basis of a limited number of
correlations’ (Bechtel, 2008b: 70). Thirdly, these inaugural state-
ments are then used to facilitate self-correcting research at
3 Bechtel & McCauley (1999); McCauley & Bechtel (2001); Bechtel (2002,
2008a,b); McCauley (2012); see also Schouten & Looren de Jong (2001); Looren
de Jong (2006); Bechtel & Hamilton (2007).
4 See McCauley & Bechtel (2001: 753) and Bechtel (2008b: 71); see also Bechtel &
McCauley (1999: 67, 71); Bechtel & Hamilton (2007: 414).
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multiple levels of analysis and explanation. As Bechtel wrote, ‘[t]he
one thing that is necessary in an overly simple initial hypothesis is
that it suggest a line of research that can reveal its own in-
adequacies and hence point to proﬁtable revisions’ (2002: 235).
These three commitments imply several interesting features.
One is that, being thoroughly hypothetical statements about psy-
choneural relations, these identities have truth-values (and so are
truth-apt). Another is that these thoroughly hypothetical truth-
evaluable statements are empirical. A third feature is that these
thoroughly hypothetical truth-evaluable empirical statements are
expected to be descriptively inadequate (typically, either false or
else not true, relative to which logics are employed). Advocates of
HIT have been clear and consistent in characterizing identities as
statements that are expressly introduced to generate research that
may heuristically expose its own errors and lead to improvements
in our epistemic situation. Indeed, because their revision and
reﬁnement is a central objective of subsequent scientiﬁc research,
these identities are intended to be disposabledi.e., the proverbial
‘ladder’ that is eventually thrown away after stimulating new
researchdunlike scientiﬁc truths, which are usually precious and
hard-won.
2.3. An induction over cases
Advocates present HIT as a general strategy of discovery that is
commonly employed during the early stages of inquiry, particu-
larly in cognitive neuroscience (Bechtel & McCauley, 1999: 67). The
justiﬁcation for HIT is generated by the method of induction over
cases: advocates attempt to document many actual cases in a va-
riety of scientiﬁc ﬁelds, where identity statements are made at the
outset of research and subsequently play a heuristic role in driving
future research before eventually being discarded. Consequently, if
HIT were correct and faithful to scientiﬁc practice, we would
expect an array of supporting historical episodes throughout the
sciences.
Bechtel & McCauley (1999) and McCauley & Bechtel (2001)
made their initial case for HIT by appealing to early research on
vision, and Bechtel’s (2008b) account of memory encoding was the
only other main documented test case of heuristic psychoneural
identities for almost a decade. Another case study pertaining to
human face recognition was recently proposed in an attempt to
strengthen this induction (Burnston et al., 2011; McCauley, 2012; cf.
Kievit et al., 2011).
The basic form of each case study is threefold: a report of the
onset of a research period, in which an alleged identity statement
bridged research at different levels of analysis and explanation,
followed by evidence that the identity statement provided the
impetus for increasingly sophisticated research and new scientiﬁc
discoveries at different levels; and ﬁnally, in order to show that
identity statements are heuristic and disposable, a demonstration
that the identity statement was later discarded once the task of
enabling was discharged.
One problem confronting HIT is that two or three (or even four)
cases make for a weak induction, and do not support the claim that
HIT is ‘a common discovery strategy in science’ (Bechtel, 2008b:
71). Accordingly, we turn to the history of electrophysiological and
psychopharmacological research on brain reward function (BRF) in
the following section. With a clearly demarcated period of inquiry,
research at multiple levels of analysis connecting psychological and
neural states, a variety of human and non-human animal studies,
rapid scientiﬁc discovery at multiple levels, and clear parallels with
the cases HIT advocates have already appealed to, we initially hy-
pothesized that BRF research would be fertile ground for psycho-
neural identity claims, and would yield additional empirical
support for HIT.
3. Heuristic identity theory (or back to the past): locating
identity claims in BRF research
3.1. Electrophysiology: the ﬁrst stream (1950e1956)
3.1.1. Serendipitous discoveries
In 1950, Robert Heath led a Tulane University medical team in
exploring whether electrical stimulation could effectively treat
schizophrenia. By the summer of 1952, Heath’s team had operated
on 24 (conscious) patients, stimulating various regionsdincluding
the caudate, hypothalamus, anterior thalamus, and septal area-
dwhile each patient reported their subjective experiences. ‘Alert-
ness’ was commonly mentioned, and patients also reported
experiencing anxiety, confusion, and lucidity. But in the four cases
involving septal stimulation, patients described their experiences
as ‘jovial’, ‘euphoric’, and ‘pleasant’ (Heath, 1954). Unfortunately,
Heath was primed to focus on observations regarding the relation
between stimulation and alertness, and overlooked the signiﬁcance
of the serendipitous discovery that septal stimulation was associ-
ated with pleasure (Baumeister, 2006: 97).
While Heath’s team was performing their surgical experiments
at Tulane, Peter Milner was at McGill University conducting his
doctoral work under Donald Hebb’s supervision; Seth Sharpless, a
philosophy student from Chicago, was working likewise in Herbert
Jasper’s nearby laboratory. With Sharpless, Milner ran pilot exper-
iments on electrical stimulation of rats’ reticular activating system;
but they were only able to demonstrate that the stimulation was
aversive (rather than motivating, as they had hoped). In the fall of
1953, James Olds arrived at McGill to begin his postdoctoral
fellowship, and Hebb had Milner teach Olds some basic neuro-
anatomy along with their intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS)
paradigm. Olds’s initial attempt to plant an electrode in the retic-
ular activating system unexpectedly resulted in one rat who
behaved as if it were being rewarded by stimulation. X-rays
conﬁrmed that Olds’s implantation had missed its mark, and that
the electrode tip had instead terminated near the septal area.
Further ICSS experiments allowed Olds & Milner to demonstrate
that rats will work hard to repeatedly operate a manipulandum for
direct electrical stimulation to the midbrain. In one case, a rat
repeatedly bar-pressed 7500 times in 12 h (1954: 425). In some
cases, response rates rose nearly to 5000 times in an hour; and in
another case, one rat bar-pressed up to 2000 times per hour for 24
consecutive hours (1956b: 114e115). The most robust and reliable
ICSS-elicited behavior was generated from the median forebrain
bundle (MFB) in the mesolimbic system, which Olds (1956b)din
his exposé of their discoverydcalled the brain’s ‘pleasure center’.
Together, these two serendipitous discoveriesdone pursued,
one notdmark the outset of over 60 years of inquiry into brain
reward function. Olds & Milner’s (1954) demonstration that
stimulation could be highly rewarding (or pleasurable or moti-
vating or reinforcingdthey knew not which) immediately insti-
gated hundreds of further studies attempting to replicate and
interpret their ﬁndings. Because they provide an operationally-
deﬁned measure of reward function, ICSS experiments quickly
became a dominant investigative approach to plumbing the
relationship between states involving neural activation of the
MFB and the hedonic state of psychological pleasure. Within just
a few years, experimenters showed that the neural circuitries
subserving reward function could be homologously activated in a
wide range of non-human animals beyond rats (e.g., snails, ﬁsh,
rabbits, cats, guinea pigs, dogs, horses, and various non-human
primates), suggesting a conservation of evolutionarily-basic
mechanisms across reward-dependent neural state types. Later
experiments also conﬁrmed that electrical stimulation of speciﬁc
brain regions has the same impact on motivation as other natural
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rewards, like food or water for hungry or thirsty animals
(Morrison, 1955; Brady et al., 1957; Trowill et al., 1969).
3.1.2. Identity crisis
The discovery of the brain’s ‘pleasure center’ was a major
episode in the history of behavioral neuroscience. HIT implies that
we should expect hypothetical psychoneural identity claims at the
outset of inquirydi.e., statements of the form x is y or x is identical
to y, where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are the types of mental and neural relata
named in statements of identity or equality (e.g., pleasure ¼ MFB
activation). A close examination of this initial period of research,
however, reveals no such statements.
Olds & Milner (1954) emphasized three ‘reward’ regions: the
septal area, cingulate cortex, and mammillothalamic tract. Their
observations led them to make three main classes of claims. First
were claims of correlation. For instance, in reviewing the previous
decade of ICSS work in rodents, Olds & Olds concluded that ‘[.] the
correlation of positive reinforcement with the anatomic system
based on the medial forebrain bundle appears to be valid’ (1963:
271; see also Olds, 1956a: 281). In human patients, Heath & Gallant
observed, ‘[i]n 14 of our 54 patients, wewere able to correlate some
types of reproducible electrical activity in speciﬁc areas of the brain
with patterns of thought activity [.] The outstanding feature of the
data obtained with our methods is a correlation between physical
activity in speciﬁc parts of the old olfactory structures of the brain
and emotional behavior’ (1964: 86, 104). And in his literature re-
view on ICSS and BRF, Philip Zeigler responded to the complaint
that the greatest gap in physiological psychology is the absence of
any convincing physiological correlate of learning and motivation
by saying that ‘[e]lectrical stimulation of the brain is among the
most promising of the available techniques for establishing such
correlates’ (1957: 363).
Second were localization claims: e.g., ‘[w]e are led to speculate
that a system of structures previously attributed to the rhinen-
cephalon may provide the locus for the reward phenomenon’, and
again, ‘[t]he brain does seem to have deﬁnite loci of pleasure and
pain, and we shall review here the experiments which have led to
this conclusion. [.] Our present tentative conclusion is that
emotional andmotivational mechanisms can indeed be localized in
the brain’ (Olds & Milner, 1954: 425; Olds, 1956b: 105, 116; see also
Bursten & Delgado, 1958). Zeigler, encapsulating these ﬁrst two
kinds of claims, lamented that ‘[o]n the basis of the studies re-
ported thus far, only one anatomical generalization may be made.
All the structures involved in this phenomenon may be included in
or related to the so-called ‘limbic system” (1957: 363, 373).
Third were claims about the causal and functional roles of
certain neural processes: e.g., ‘electrical stimulation in the septal
area has an effect which is apparently equivalent to that of a con-
ventional primary reward [.]’ (Olds & Milner, 1954: 421); and e.g.,
‘[. w]e have perhaps located a system within the brain whose
peculiar function is to produce a rewarding effect on behavior’, and
again, ‘[.] there is an area in the basomedial forebrain at about the
level where the islands of calleja are most pronounced where
electrical stimulation has extremely great rewarding effects’ (1954:
426; Olds, 1956c: 511). Other scientists building on Olds & Milner’s
initial discovery took them to have ‘demonstrated a rewarding
effect produced by electric stimulation of some areas of the brain’
(Sidman et al., 1955: 830; see also Olds, 1958), although a few were
less assertive. Zeigler, encapsulating these latter two kinds of
claims, cautioned that ‘[i]t has not yet been conclusively demon-
strated that we are dealing with ‘pleasure centers’ or ‘a system
within the brain whose function it is to produce a rewarding effect
upon behavior” (1957: 373). Even still, the use of causal-
mechanical production-language of the form activity in brain
region x produces or elicits effect y turns out to be a persistent trend
in early ICSS literature. But to interpret this production-language in
terms of heuristic identities would be to commit the infamous
‘Betty Crocker fallacy’ inwhich non-causal relations like identity or
constitution are confused for causal ones (Churchland, 1998). To
their credit, advocates of HIT have typically avoided this fallacy
(e.g., Craver & Bechtel, 2007; Wimsatt, 1976a,b); but continuing to
do so requires restricting their basis of textual evidence so that
statements about the causal production of mental states and pro-
cesses are not confused with identity statements. Prima facie,
production is one relation, identity another.
These three types of relational claimsdi.e., correlation, locali-
zation, and causal/functional role ascriptiondare no more consis-
tent with HIT than with its competitors; traditional identity
theorists and functionalists, for example, could accommodate them
all. More problematically, whereas these three types of relational
claims are ubiquitous in the scientiﬁc literature, relational claims
about any kind of identity (type/type, token/token, etc.) are alto-
gether absent from all major scientiﬁc reports comprising the early
ICSS literature. Heath’s work did not include them. Olds’s papers
did not include them; neither did Milner’s, nor their joint papers,
nor those that they wrote with neuroscientists Brenda Milner or
Marianne Olds. Identity claims are also absent from the Masters
thesis of Olds’s main student at the time, Rolfe Morrison, and they
do not appear, inter alia, in Sharpless’s work with Jasper.
A fourth class of claims were those of a merely predicational
nature: e.g., ‘[there are] subcortical areas in the human brain in
which brief electrical stimulation appears to have rewarding or
reinforcing properties’ (Bishop et al., 1963: 396). But in all such
cases, statements of predication, function and production, location,
or correlation fail to amount to anything resembling identity
claims, and so fail to vindicate HIT. Since the ICSS literature provides
a canonical case study for HIT and HIT implies that identity state-
ments are posited at the outset of research, the lack of identities in
the literature is unsettling.
3.2. Neuropharmacology: the second stream (1957e1976)
3.2.1. Dopamine
Just when the electrophysiology of BRF was taking shape, so too
was the neurochemistry underlying reward. The mid-1950s saw
early suggestions concerning the physiological signiﬁcance of
dopamine (DA), along with further discovery of DAwithin the brain
(Blaschko, 1957; Montagu, 1957; Carlsson et al., 1958). As in-
vestigations into the occurrence of DA neurons continued, areas
with high concentrations of DA (speciﬁcally the corpus striatum)
were shown to contain less noradrenaline (NA) than expected
(Bertler & Rosengren, 1959). Some took the distribution of DA in the
brain to indicate a function unique to this previously-overlooked
neurotransmitter (Carlsson, 1959). Advancements in histochemi-
cal methods allowed researchers to trace the brain pathways of
catecholamine neurons within a decade, leading to the discovery of
a nigro-neostriatal DA neuron system, and DA pathways projecting
from the substantia nigra pars compacta and the ventral tegmental
area (Dahlstrom & Fuxe, 1965; Anden et al. 1966; Hornykiewicz,
1966).
Neuropharmacological research proved to be integral to the
formation of catecholaminergic theories of reward. In one of the
earliest attempts to bridge neuropharmacological and electro-
physiological ICSS research, Olds et al. (1956) showed that reser-
pine and other catecholamine-blocking tranquilizers diminished
reward functionality in hypothalamic- and septal-area electrode
placements. Other early experiments investigated the effects of
tranquilizing agents on rates of self-stimulation, and, following
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histochemically-veriﬁed sites of NA ﬁbers, led to the hypothesis
that reward was primarily mediated by NA (Olds & Travis, 1960;
Stein, 1968; Margules, 1969). The noradrenergic theory of reward
was further bolstered by the ﬁnding that tendencies toward self-
stimulation were abolished by inhibiting the conversion of DA to
NA (Stein & Wise, 1969; Wise & Stein, 1969).
The 1970s, however, saw the role previously ascribed to NA
eclipsed in favor of a dopaminergic theory of reward.5 Facilitation of
DA activity with DA agonists (e.g., amphetamine) have concomitant
effects on ICSS response rates (Crow, 1972), while administration of
DA antagonists suppress self-stimulation (Franklin, 1978). On the
other hand, neither DA-b-hydroxylase inhibitors (e.g., disulfuram),
which selectively block NA synthesis without perturbing DA, nor
neurochemical 6-hydroxydopamine lesions of nuclei in the lower
brain stem (e.g., A1, A2, A5, A7) and locus coeruleus (A6), which
deplete forebrain NA, diminished self-stimulation behavior (Lippa
et al., 1973; Clavier et al., 1976; Koob et al., 1976; Corbett et al.,
1977). These and other ﬁndings led to the emergence of the DA
theory of reward as the most promising and fruitful investigative
direction.
The catecholaminergic theories of reward advanced in the late
1960s and 1970s would seem to be a good place to uncover some of
the identity claims predicted by HIT. Identiﬁcation of the psycho-
logical states of pleasure and rewarddnot simply with states of the
MFB as its neuroanatomical locusdbut with the activities or pro-
cesses of neurotransmitters (e.g., NA and DA) throughout the
brain’s mesocorticolimbic systems, would square nicely with the
standard HIT narrative.
While relatively simplistic hypotheses involving certain mental
states and neural states were superseded by those involving NA,
and later, DA activity, statements of identity relations remain ab-
sent from the scientiﬁc literature.With regard to earlier NA theories
of reward, one sees the same classes of claims: production, corre-
lation, localization, and functional role ascriptiondand occasional
grounding-like claims. For instance, Stein stated that ‘[.] electrical
stimulation of the MFB produces at least part of its rewarding [.]
effect by activating adrenergic synapses in the lateral hypothala-
mus, pre-optic area, limbic lobe, and neocortex’ (1967: 139). Com-
menting on the signiﬁcance of the observed release of NA into the
rostral hypothalamus and amygdala by ‘rewarding MFB stimula-
tion’ Stein & Wise concluded ‘that the release of norepinephrine at
these and other terminal sites of the MFB in the forebrain is
responsible, at least in part, for the facilitation of behavior caused
by rewarding stimulation’ (1969: 197). Cutting to the chase, Mar-
gules reported that ‘[.] dorsal tegmental reward has a noradren-
ergic basis’ (1969: 34). These and hundreds of other similar
statements again reveal that identity claimsdheuristic or oth-
erwisedare not posited at the outset of research. Rather than
claims about the relation of identity between psychological states
of pleasure, reward, motivation, or the like, on one hand, and the
activity of a major neurotransmitter system on the otherdas one
would expect if HIT were correct, what one ﬁnds are attributions of
a generic ‘basis’ or ‘role’ of various neurotransmitters in the reward
phenomenon.6
In sum, examination of the history of BRF research reveals no
heuristic identity statements at the outset of inquiry. In these
early stages, scientists instead ventured claims about correlation,
localization, and causal/functional roles. This resultdcontrary to
our initial hypothesisdis both puzzling, since BRF research should
be relatively ideal ground for HIT, and worrisome, since the
argument for HIT is an induction over (presently few) cases. To be
clear, no one thinks that a single disconﬁrming case or counter-
example demonstrates that HIT is incorrect. But what the absence
of identity statements does do is warrant doubt and further
scrutiny.
4. Re-evaluating HIT
4.1. Establishing the outset of inquiry
Can the absence of heuristic identity statements be explained
away? One possibility would be to suggest either that they occurred
much earlier than the 1950s, or else occurred much later. Neither of
these goalpost-moving gambits is likely to work, however.
While some interesting research on pleasure and euphoria was
conducted at the end of the 19th century, much of it was con-
ceptual and most scholars demured from asserting identities. For
instance, Henry Rutgers Marshall, whose algedonic continuum
theory of pain/pleasure eschewed the identiﬁcation of pleasures
with either sensations or brain processes, is representative of both
the trends and the knowledge at the time: ‘[t]here is not the
faintest indication, to my knowledge, of the existence of a pleasure
center in the brain’ (1892: 634). One obvious reason why is just
that midbrain structures are difﬁcult to access, and the methods of
the day did not permit deep brain stimulation experiments.
Moreover, from the beginning to mid-20th century, much of the
relevant research focused on behavioral responses to external
rewarding stimuli rather than conative or cognitive experience or
neural localization.
As for the second stream, the story of DA does have an inter-
esting prehistory, dating back to 1910e1911. Independently of
each other, George Barger & Alfred Ewins (1910), working at the
Wellcome Physiological Research Laboratory in London, and Carl
Mannich & Willy Jacobson (1910), working at the University of
Berlin’s Institute of Pharmacology, ﬁrst synthesized DA. With
Barger, Henry Dale (1910) began characterizing its pharmacolog-
ical effects in cats. A year later, the Polish chemist Casimir Funk
(1911) ﬁrst synthesized DOPA at the Lister Institute of Preven-
tive Medicine in London. Torquato Torquati unwittingly isolated
the precursor L-dopa, and his (1913) results were more robustly
chemically characterized by Markus Guggenheim (1913) at Hoff-
man LaRoche in Switzerland, who self-experimented with large
doses of L-dopa. But despite this burst of research in numerous
labs in various countries, there were no attempts to connect up
these biochemical results with research about either neural or
psychological states, and so no attempts to state psychoneural
identities. Indeed, the realization that DA occurs naturally in the
brain was still several decades off (Roe, 1997).
While it has long been established that the 1950s marked the
outset of research into BRF, it is also possible that advocates
might instead claim that research into BRF in the 1950s was
insufﬁciently developed to have warranted any scientists mak-
ing any heuristic identity claims. That maneuver gives the
appearance of playing a shell game, however, which shelters HIT
from potentially problematic cases. Secondly, in pursuing it,
advocates of HIT incur the burden of providing a general answer
about the conditions on research maturation. More problemat-
ically still, the maneuver may backﬁre, since cases where
identity claims are made only after research has sufﬁciently
5 For an overview of this literature, see Hornykiewicz (1986, 2002); Milner
(1991); Marsden (2006); Wise (2008).
6 In more recent literature in the 1990s and beyond, the computational functions
of DA in relation to reward prediction error, incentive salience, and precision have
become important research foci (see Colombo, 2014 for an overview; see also
Colombo & Wright, 2017). While constructs like COMPUTATIONAL EQUIVALENCE and
ISOMORPHISM are employed to characterize DA activity computationally, they differ
from the concept IDENTITY and so cannot just be substituted for it. If this literature
vindicates any philosophical frameworks, functionalism would likely come before
HIT.
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developed may be cases that better support the traditional
identity theory over HIT.
4.2. Cartesianism to the rescue?
Amore plausible response stems from the observation that both
Cartesianism about animal minds and behaviorism were paradig-
matic in psychology in the 1950s; and either one may have
inhibited neuroscientists’ willingness to theorize about psycho-
logical states or processes as the relata of identity relations.
While the cognitive revolution was in full swing by 1959e1960,
this historical context is certainly important not to underlook.
However, in so looking, observe that the literature published during
this period of serendipitous discovery on non-human animal sub-
jects was perfectly sanguine in ascribing mental states like plea-
sure, reward, motivation, and emotion. For instance, Brady’s (1955)
ICSS experiments focused on ‘motivationaleemotional factors’. For
his part, Olds described his experiments with Milner in terms of
experimentation on “higher feelings’ such as love, fear, pain, and
pleasure’, and construed ICSS experiments on rats as a psycholog-
ical method for detecting and measuring positive emotional
behaviordpleasure and the satisfaction of speciﬁc ‘wants’ (1956b:
105, 107); moreover, commentators at the time interpreted these
descriptions as such: e.g., ‘Olds has proposed that the pleasure
system works as a positive feedback mechanism [.]’ (Pribram,
1960: 9).
Early 1960s studies of electrical stimulation on human subjects’
mental states and processes were also no less sanguine. Not only
did they lend support to Olds’s initial hypotheses, but also they
continued to resort to the language of ‘production’ and ‘correla-
tion’dnot identity, nor even equalitydto do so.7 For instance,
Heath stated that ‘[t]he ﬁndings reported herein are consistent
with other data obtained in our depth electrode studies in man
which indicate a correlation between activity of the septal region
and the pleasure response’ (1972: 15e16). And as Sem-Jacobsen
reported, ‘[f]eeling of ease and relaxation, feeling of joy with
smiling, and great satisfaction have been elicited from different
areas’ (1959: 414). Consequently, it’s worth considering whether
neuroscientists’ willingness to experiment on and theorize about
psychological states was inhibited by either Cartesianism about
animal minds or behaviorism; but as an explanation for the lack of
identity statements at the outset of research, this one provides
insufﬁcient cover.
4.3. Rethinking HIT’s other case studies
The absence of identity statements at the outset of inquiry into
the nature of BRF, heuristic or otherwise, warrants scrutiny of the
claim that HIT captures a widely-used research strategy, as well as a
closer look back at the original cases put forward in support of HIT.
Upon closer scrutiny, those original cases provide the support for
HIT only under a very heterodox conceptualization of identity.
4.3.1. pFC processing and memory
One can be a mechanist without being a heuristic identity
theorist, just as one can be a heuristic identity theorist without
being a mechanist: these two theories are logically independent. So
it is interesting that Bechtel (2008b: 78) describes Endel Tulving’s
neuroimaging research on episodic memory as an ‘exemplar of a
heuristic identity claim’. Exemplary in what sense? Bechtel’s
answer is this:
Tulving and collaborators advanced the hemispheric encoding/
retrieval asymmetry (HERA) hypothesis according to which the
left pFC is more involved than the right in encoding information
about novel events (and in retrieval of information from se-
mantic memory), while the right pFC is more involved than the
left in tasks involving retrieval of episodic memories. [.] HERA
is a bold hypothesis implying that different brain areas are
responsible for the operations of encoding and retrieval of
episodic memories. It constitutes an important step towards
developing a functional decomposition into component opera-
tions of the overall mechanism presumed responsible for
episodic memory. As is often the case, such initial steps do not
settle the matter, but prepare the way for further research.
(2008b: 77e78)
As Bechtel presented it, Tulving hypothesized that different
areas of the pFC are differentially ‘involved in’ and ‘responsible
for’ different mnemonic operations. Elsewhere, he suggested that
the relation hypothesized by Tulving was the ‘linking’ relation
(2008a: 990). But involvement is not identity; it is not even
equality or equivalence. Mutatis mutandis for the linking rela-
tion: hypothesizing or even demonstrating that two relata are
linked is to state or show little more than that they are co-
related. Nor are the predicates ‘being responsible for’ and ‘be-
ing identical with’ even approximately coextensive, and neither
does the former advance beyond a correlation in its implications.
Consequently, HIT seems to have a bait-and-switch problem; for
where the identity relation should be posited, as would be ex-
pected of an identity theorist, we are treated only to the much
weaker ‘linking’ and ‘involvement’ relations between brain
structures and mental operations.
4.3.2. FFA processing and face perception
Advocates have recruited another case to support HIT: research
on face perception in relation to activity in the fusiform face area
(FFA). But, here, too, the same problems recur.
Nancy Kanwisher and colleagues reported a three-part fMRI
study that they took to warrant the claim that ‘[FFA] is selectively
involved in the perception of faces’; they further suggested that
disconﬁrmation of alternative hypotheses increases the probability
that face perception and recognition is indeed localized in FFA: ‘the
elimination of these main alternative hypotheses provides
compelling evidence that [FFA .] is speciﬁcally involved in the
perception of faces’ (1997: 4302, 4309).
After rehearsing these ‘involvement’-claims, McCauley took the
liberty of construing them as direct evidence for HIT:
[a]fter providing additional negative experimental evidence
against a few more of the prominent alternative hypotheses,
Kanwisher, McDermott, and Chun identify activity in the FFA
with the (psychological) task of face perception. Their protes-
tation about ‘compelling evidence’ notwithstanding, they have
advanced a theoretically provocative, cross-scientiﬁc, hypo-
thetical identity. (2012: 199)
McCauley’s misrepresentation of the scientists’ claims is no
isolated incident; advocates of HIT have presented a uniﬁed front:
‘the identity claim, then, is that the process of face recognition is
identical to the activity of the FFA’ (Burnston et al., 2011: 111).
Granted, statements such as ‘face recognition processes are iden-
tical to FFA processes’ or ‘the activity of recognizing faces is iden-
tical to the activity of the FFA’ are indeed identity statements. The
trouble is that the statements were asserted, or even inventeddnot7 See, e.g., Sem-Jacobsen (1959); Delgado & Hamlin (1960); Bishop et al. (1963);
Heath (1963); Heath & Gallant (1964).
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by Kanwisher and her colleaguesdbut by advocates of HIT
themselves.8
For their part, the scientists neither explicitly asserted nor
tacitly implied or committed themselves to any such identity
claims. What they did conclude is the weaker claim that FFA is
selectively involved in the perception of faces. And not only have
they yet to publicly endorse HIT, they have consistently articulated
this weaker and more cautious conclusion for almost two decades.
For example, in their review of the literature of face perception,
Kanwisher & Yovel summarized their position as follows: ‘[i]n this
chapter, we described the current state of knowledge about face-
selective regions of cortex in humans and their role in face
perception. Current evidence supports the hypothesis that the FFA
is speciﬁcally involved in face perception per se’ (2009: 853e854).9
4.4. Casting a broader net
The failure of BRF research to conﬁrm HIT prompted a reap-
praisal of the cases previously invoked to support HIT; in turn,
closer scrutiny of those cases reveals not only that identity state-
ments do not occur in their respective scientiﬁc literature, either,
but also that advocates are doing substantial interpretative work in
understanding the research.
HIT advocates have not articulated what they count as identities.
But Bechtel & McCauley (1999) and McCauley & Bechtel (2001) do
motivate HIT as one way of responding to objections against the
traditional type-identity theory in the philosophy of minddmore
on this in x5dand do emphasize that HIT embeds the principle of
the indiscernibility of identicals (i.e., the converse of ‘Leibniz’s law’).
So, while it is not impossible that they have a heterodox concep-
tualization in mind, the far simpler andmore natural interpretation
is just that they construe identity classically (i.e., as a dyadic
equivalence relation with the usual features: reﬂexivity, symmetry,
transitivity, bijectivity, etc.). But if identity is understood in this
way, then HIT suffers from a lack of empirical support.
Of course, since its advocates have not speciﬁed how they
conceive of identity, perhaps what these results reveal is that HIT
requires a broader conceptualization of identitydone with non-
strict criteria, which encompasses causal and functional relations,
plus relations of localization and correlation in addition to equiv-
alence or equality.
On this broader understanding of identity, the cases previously
reviewedwould provide empirical support for HIT. But it also incurs
problems. One is that HIT no longer appears as a genuine alterna-
tive to the type-type identity theory, so much as a misleading
relabeling of mechanists’ strategies for mechanism discovery.
Relatedly, the reconceptualization is heterodox at best, and not
obviously a theory of identity. And it would fail to distinguish be-
tween different kinds of hypotheses advanced during early stages
of scientiﬁc research, which may play different heuristic roles in
scientiﬁc discovery, explanation, and conﬁrmation.
Ultimately, then, advocates appear caught in a dilemma: either
HIT adequately describes scientiﬁc practice but not psychoneural
identity, or else HIT adequately describes psychoneural identity but
not scientiﬁc practice.10 In the next two sections, we focus on
further worries and argue that HIT suffers from conceptual confu-
sion. Meantime, we conclude that the case-based inductive argu-
ment for HIT remains weak: at present, there is no chronicle of any
cavalcade of heuristic identities.
5. HIT as type-identity theory?
5.1. Correlation objection
5.1.1. Mapping, correspondence, identity
HIT was motivated, in part, by the need to respond to the so-
called ‘correlation objection’ to the traditional mind/brain
identity theory. According to Bechtel & McCauley (1999: 67, 69),
the objection is as follows. While neuroscientists can discern
and isolate certain brain states or processes that are correlated
or associated with certain mental states or processes, there is no
possible evidence that could support advancing from correla-
tions to identities that would not also apply, eo ipso, to the
correlations themselves. So identity theorists cannot establish
the actual identity of neural and psychological states, but only
their regular correlation; statements about psychoneural corre-
lations exhaust the factual content of hypothesized identity
statements.
In response, Bechtel & McCauley averred that ‘mapping at least
some mental states (viz., many that ﬁgure in scientiﬁc psychology)
one-to-one with physical states is a perfectly normal part of
research in cognitive neuroscience’ (1999: 67). And indeed it is. But
how does this response address the correlation objection?
For a function f : M / P from the domain of (descriptions of)
mental states or processes to the codomain of (descriptions of)
physical states or processes to be one-to-one, every image of the
codomain must be mapped to by at most one argument of the
domain. Hence, if f (x) ¼ f (y) implies x ¼ y for all x, y ˛ M, then
indeed, every mental state or process can be injectively mapped
with physical states or processes. The mapping need not also be
onto; presumably, some physical states (e.g., total persistent
vegetative coma) won’t themselves backmap to mental states or
processes. But neither will it be one-to-one unless everydnot just
at least somedimage of the codomain gets mapped to by each
argument xi.
Genuine one-to-one mappings might also be insufﬁcient if the
kinds of mappings required to warrant type-type mind/brain
identity statements have to be invertible. Relatedly, while an
identity function i(x)¼ x has the feature of being one-to-one, it also
has the feature of being onto; since solely one-to-one functions
don’t have that feature, neither will they just be an identity func-
tion unless upgraded further. So what’s needed is an identity
relation, not Bechtel & McCauley’s injective ‘mapping of at least
some mental states’.
Moreover, a mapping that is both one-to-one and onto will give
us the correspondence relation. But the correspondence relation
differs from identity. For example, in the truth literature, corre-
spondence theorists contend that true propositions correspond to
facts; among their arch-rivals are the identity theorists, most of
whom take facts just to be true propositions. Just as wewould err in
8 Given that the reputation of HIT is staked on increased sensitivity to actual
scientiﬁc practice, it’s troubling that readers who are unfamiliar the Kanwisher
paper are simply just forced to take these HIT claims at face value. If this reputation
is bought at the price of ignoring rudimentary metaphysical issues about relations,
then it is a price not worth paying.
9 One reason why Kanwisher, Haxby, Yovel, and other researchers have not
asserted the identity of FFA activity and the perceptual processing of faces is that
FFA activity was always only part of the neuroanatomical story, and scientists
knew this two decades ago. Current understanding suggests that the network is
functionally partitioned into ventral and dorsal streams, which are constituted in
part by face-selective areas in both the anterior and posterior superior temporal
sulcus (aSTS-FA, pSTS-FA), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG-F), and the anterior
temporal and right occipital lobes (ATL-FA, OFA) (Duchaine & Yovel, 2015).
Because the mechanism(s) enjoy a complex localization through a network of
neural areas and pathways, face perception appears not to be strictly identical
with FFA activity. 10 We thank one referee for helping us frame the problem this way.
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confusing their respective theories, we ought to distinguish mind/
brain correspondence theories from identity theories. Even if we
further upgraded what Bechtel & McCauley had in mind to a
bijective mapping, the correlation objection may still be gripping;
for even if each mental state or process in the domain were
uniquely mapped to and from each physical state or process in the
codomain, it would follow that mental and physical states or pro-
cesses are isomorphic but not yet that the mental and physical
states or processes of each ordered pair are strictly indistinguish-
able with respect to any/all of their features. Isomorphism is not
automorphism.
5.1.2. Establishing identities
Bechtel & McCauley offer a second response to the correlation
objection on behalf of the type-identity theory: ‘In a perversely
Humean spirit, [objectors] set the bar impossibly high, requiring
identity theorists to establish each identity claim’s truthdin
effectdbeyond a shadow of a doubt. Discredited in philosophy of
science, veriﬁcationism, oddly, enjoys new life in philosophy of
mind’ (1999: 69).
First, the correlation objection neither entails nor is entailed by
veriﬁcationism, whether in the philosophies of science or mind or
semantics or elsewhere. These are orthogonal ideas. Second,
whether the stronger case for any putative identities ultimately
always collapses into the weaker case for correlations or corre-
spondences does not pertain to the project of doubt-removal,
whether construed in terms of the achievement of epistemic
states like knowledge or the occurrence of psychological states like
certainty and overconﬁdence. So the suggestions that the correla-
tion objection either has given new life to veriﬁcationism, or im-
plies a requirement to establish beyond a shadow of a doubt the
truth of an identity statement, are largely immaterial. In this pas-
sage, Bechtel & McCauley have introduced a red herring; and so if
there are good responses to the correlation objection, this is not one
of them.
Still, one may suspect that spirited Humeans are afoot. Suppose
that s is an identity statement of the form ‘Fa ¼ Fb’. Given that s
only if ‘s’ is true, then for subject S to establish identity statements
just is for S to establish truths about the actual identity of those
neural and psychological states. Is this, as Bechtel & McCauley
complain, a bar too high? Well, any such bar that can be raised by
alethic ascent can also be lowered; for the familiar T-schemata
sanction a logical equivalence between truth-apt identity state-
ments and explicit ascriptions of truth to them. Given that ‘s’ is
true only if s, then for S to establish truths about the actual
identity of neural and psychological states just is for S to establish
those identity statements. Consequently, and contra Bechtel &
McCauley, the correlation objection does not necessarily require
identity theorists to establish each identity claim’s truth, much
less beyond a shadow of a doubt. Rather, the objector can just as
well be understood as just challenging identity theorists to
establish any identity statement.
5.2. Necessity
With their Kripkean counterparts, advocates of HIT also take
identity statements to be neither analytic nor a priori; but while
synthetic and a posteriori, they deny that identities have their
truth-values necessarily: they are neither necessarily true nor
necessarily false. Instead, advocates take them to be possibly true
but probably false. Of course, familiar arguments take this idea to be
a mistake. Given the modal necessity of self-identity, it seems to
follow that if any two individuals a and b are identical then
necessarily they are identical:
1: ða ¼ bÞ ½supposition of identity%
2: ð,ða ¼ aÞ
3: ð,ða ¼ aÞI,ða ¼ aÞÞ
4: ð,ða ¼ aÞI,ða ¼ bÞÞ
5: ð,ða ¼ bÞ
6: ða ¼ bÞIð,ða ¼ bÞÞ
½necessity of self-identity%
½redundancy%
½substitution%
½MP%
½necessity of identity%
The argument supposes an identity, and then uses the necessity of
self-identity to validly demonstrate that identities are necessary. If
HIT advocates deny the conclusion, likely they must also deny the
initial premisedthe supposition of contingent identity. After all, to
suppose a contingent identity between a and b is to suppose that
‘a ¼ b’ is true; but, pace HIT, ‘a ¼ b’ is contingently untrue and
merely plays a heuristic role. Yet, if ‘‘a ¼ b’ is a contingently untrue’
implies that as b, then the denial of ‘a ¼ b’ looks to be the denial
that an identity holdsdnot the acceptance or advancement of a
special kind of heuristic identity.11 So the issue is not easy to waive
off. More problematically, if all identities are necessary and heu-
ristic ‘identities’ are not necessary, then neither are they identities.
5.3. Heuristic identity statements as premises
Scientiﬁc explanation and prediction have often been refor-
mulated argumentatively. Accordingly, Bechtel & McCauley take
identity statements to play the role of premises in explanatory ar-
guments, and take the statements themselves to need no further
explanation.12 One reason why is that scientists cannot be said to
come to explanatory knowledge of what is contingently untrue.
Consequently, unless scientists infer them from false premises,
heuristic identity statements cannot serve as the conclusions of
good explanatory arguments. Advocates of HIT are happy to accept
the latter disjunct: it is because heuristic identities cannot serve as
the conclusions of good explanatory arguments that they must
serve as their premises if they participate at all.
But neither is it clear that heuristic identities can serve as the
premises of good explanatory arguments. Traditional identity the-
orists can conclude that a ¼ b from the premises that mental state
a ¼ the state that has F and neural state b has F; or from the pre-
mises that mental state a is F and neural state b is F, but that only
one state is F; or from others still. But whereas traditional identity
theorists can generate valid reconstructions of explanatory argu-
ments involving hypothetical identities, heuristic identity theorists
cannot just transpose premises and conclusions without imputing
invalid reasoning to scientists; for from the premise that a ¼ b, it
does not follow that mental state a ¼ the state that has F, nor that
neural state b has F, nor their conjunction (even if all true). Like-
wise, neither does it follow that mental state a is F, nor that neural
state b is F, nor that only one state is F, nor their conjunction.
So, given that premises and conclusions cannot be simply
transposed, the thought that hypothetical identity statements are
not the conclusions of scientiﬁc research but the premises leaves
unaddresseddunlike the traditional versiondwhat sorts of con-
clusions HIT takes to be derived from those identities.
11 To assert s just is to present s as being true. If identities are, ex hypothesi,
disposable heuristics that are probably untrue, then scientists’ utterances of iden-
tities are unlikely to have the illocutionary force of assertion, pace HIT. Acceptance
and advancement are not normatively constrained in the same way.
12 See Bechtel & McCauley (1999: 69); McCauley & Bechtel (2001: 737, 753, 756);
McCauley (2007: 153); Bechtel (2008a,b: 70); McCauley (2012: 192, 193); see also
Wright (2012, 2015) for discussion of the epistemic conception of explanation. It is
unclear whether HIT has anti-realist implications; but the presumption of identities
being, ex hypothesi, false premises or input that inaugurate a period of scientiﬁc
research severs the relationship between truth and success at the heart of the
abductive inference for scientiﬁc realism.
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Worse, the claim that identities are premises also threatens to
misrepresent the dispute between the traditional and heuristic
versions. Various philosophers of mind (e.g., Hill, 1991; Kim, 1996;
McLaughlin, 2001) have argued that identity is the best explanation
of strong correlations of properties but not vice-versa; but in that
case, statements of correlations serve as derived conclusions while
identity statements serve as premises in the traditional identity
theory no less than the hypothetical identity claims of HIT. More-
over, traditional identity theorists can likewise accept that identi-
ties do not themselves require explanations. Yet, as Polger (2004:
32, 37) argues, it is because identities are necessary that no further
explanation of them is needed.
6. Does HIT rest on confusion?
6.1. Equivocation
In the caption of the ‘locations of function’ diagram in Olds’s
Scientiﬁc American paper, he wrote, ‘[t]he labels here identify the
centers which correspond to those investigated in the rat’
(1956b: 107). Obviously enough, ‘identify’ here means little
more than ‘name’ or ‘denote’, and has nothing to do with the
sense of identity relevant to any traditional version of identity
theory. Yet, in re-examining HIT’s celebrated case studies, notice
that advocates frequently confuse two kinds of claims by
equivocating over ‘identity’ and ‘identity’-esque terms: claims
about the ‘identity’ of states and claims about ‘identifying’ (or
discovering) states. The former concerns a particular kind of
relation, identity, while the latter concerns scientists’ recogni-
tional abilities to detect and characterize. The former is relevant
to evaluating whether HIT is a genuine version of identity the-
ory; the latter is a Trojan horse.
The equivocation works by ﬁrst focusing on the scientiﬁc
endeavor of ‘identifying’ phenomenadi.e., detecting a neural
structure or discerning a mental operationdand then by exploit-
ing the nominalization ‘identiﬁcation’ to confuse the aforemen-
tioned senses of identity relation and detection/recognition
abilities. To take one example, Bechtel self-describes the
‘approach, which [he and McCauley] have dubbed heuristic iden-
tity theory’, as ‘requir[ing] not just identifying the brain areas
associated with cognitive tasks but using such identiﬁcations as
heuristic guides to understanding how the brain performs those
tasks’ (2008b: 50; see also Bechtel, 2012: 4; McCauley, 2012: 199).
Here, HIT is described as requiring two things: ﬁrstly, that brain
areas be discovered and recognized for what they are and what
they do. But again, recognition is one thing, identity something
altogether different. Secondly, HIT is described as requiring that
brain areas be ‘associated with cognitive tasks’. But neither is
identity mere association, on any analysis; claims about psycho-
neural associations or correlations are not intersubstitutable for
psychoneural identities.
The confusion of, and equivocation on, these two kinds of
claims is no isolated incident.13 For instance, Bechtel goes on to
describe ‘recent research that is directed towards identifying the
brain structures involved when people perform various memory
tasks can play a heuristic role in identifying the mental operations
involved’ (2008b: 71), which ramiﬁes throughout his discussion of
‘ways in which identifying working parts of a neural mechanism
can serve a heuristic role in identifying mental operations’ (2008b:
76). Of course, it’s perfectly reasonable to maintain that scientists
who ascertain that some entity is what performs an activity (that
p is j-ing, that j-ing occurs in p, etc.) have thereby performed an
identifying act; but identifying acts in this sense of recognition
and ascertainment are irrelevant to the debate with traditional
identity theorists over whether mental states and processes are
type-type identical to neural states and processes.14 And this
irrelevance prompts the worry that the whole of HIT rests on a
mistake.
6.2. Identities as mere localizations
Mechanists maintain that phenomena are scientiﬁcally
explained in terms of mechanisms, but there is no consensus on
how best to characterize the relationship between them. Different
mechanists have focused on different kinds of relationships,
including those picked out by the phrases being responsible for,
producing, underlying, andmaintaining. None of these relationships
amount to a (heuristically described) identity relationship.
The contemporary analysis of mechanisms is framed using
structure versus function and entity versus activity distinctions,
applied in both inter- and intralevel contexts.15 By their very nature,
mechanisms and mechanistic systems are both hierarchical and
mereological, in at least the sense that they are constituted, inter
alia, by part/whole relations between structures at different
levels.16 Construed functionally, a mechanistic activity f-ing is
composed of component activities j1, ., jn, each of which is the
activity of at least one component entity pi. Construed structurally,
a mechanism S is composed of component entities p1,., pn, each
of which interacts with other such entities in virtue of performing
at least one activity ji. The component partsdwhether activities or
entitiesdoccur at lower levels than do the composite systemic
activities and entities constituted by them.
Localization and de-/composition are essential experimental
and explanatory strategies in mechanistic science, and statements
about them are ubiquitous. As Bechtel reminds, ‘[i]dentifying parts
and operations requires decomposing a mechanismdtaking it
apart (actually, or in analysis) either structurally into its parts or
functionally into its operations. One important part of this task is
localizing operations in the parts that perform them.’ (2012: 4).
While this is an entirely à propos rehearsal of mechanists’ doctrine,
what advocates of HIT add is that statements about localization and
identiﬁcation are actually clandestine identity statements:
[l]ocalization claims are identity claims between the parts
characterized in terms of their physical constitutions and parts
characterized in terms of the operations they are involved in.
(Bechtel, 2012)
[s]ince localization claims maintain that it is the same entity
that constitutes a particular structure and has performs [sic] a
speciﬁc operation, they are identity claims in the sense
13 Nor is it conﬁned to cognitive neuroscience. The confusion between the identity
relation, on one hand, and the event or activity of specifying one or more relata, on
the other, was applied to cell biology and biochemistry too: ‘cytologists using
various microscopes, identiﬁed various organelles in the cell, whereas biochemists,
preparing homogenates and using various assays, identiﬁed chemical reactions’
(Bechtel & Hamilton, 2007: 413).
14 It also puts philosophers who are looking for an alternative to the standard
psychoneural identity-cum-reduction accounts, and who are sympathetic to
explanatory pluralism, in a bind. For example, Schouten & Looren de Jong tried to
navigate the problem by artfully deploying phrases like ‘identiﬁcatory connections
between [.] accounts of vision’ (2001: 801) in order to clarify HIT without
committing themselves to the mistake.
15 See, e.g., Bechtel (2002, 2008b); Craver & Bechtel (2007); Schouten & Looren de
Jong (2001); Wright & Bechtel (2007); Wright (2007, 2012).
16 It is important to clarify that the constitutive relevance relation differs from the
kinds of identity relations posited by identity theorists. Unlike identity, constitutive
relevance relations obtain between a whole and its part, and mechanists employ
them for distinguishing relevant from irrelevant factors in a mechanism (see Craver
& Bechtel, 2007).
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advanced by the mind/brain identity theory. (Bechtel &
Hamilton, 2007: 413)
Granted, the normal course of mechanistic science may involve
scientists ascertaining that some component activity or function is
performed by some component entity or structural part. But it does
not follow that localization statements just are identity statements.
(The seat of the soul is the pineal gland, says the Cartesian. But
localizing the soul thus hardly sufﬁces to unmask our Cartesian as a
psychoneural identity theorist.)
First-order localization statements of the form ‘p has the activity
j’ or ‘the j-ing is done by p’ have a basic subject-predicate struc-
ture. So, too, do second-order localization statements that predicate
something to either possessive nominal (i.e., p’s j-ing) with
grammatical landmark/trajector structure or the subject term of a
deﬁnite description (the f-ing of S, etc.). But there is a yawning
logical difference between statements of predication and attribu-
tion versus statements of identity, and mechanists have no good
reason to go along with advocates of HIT in conﬂating the ‘is’ of
predication with the ‘is’ of identity.
Moreover, in quantifying over a particular component part pi as
what has property F or what plays the functional role Fx, localiza-
tion statements still express a simple predication of the form ‘dx
such that Fx ^ x ¼ pi’. Yet, none of this implies that operations and
activities just are the entities that perform them. To take one
example, phasic bursting (j-ing) is a basic operation of VTA DA
neurons (p) in the mesocorticolimbic system (Grace, 1991). But
they are cross-categorical classes of phenomenadneither identical
nor equivalentdand many other kinds of cells besides VTA DA
neurons in many different neural areas besides the meso-
corticolimbic system also engage in this kind of signaling. So
bursting is localizable to VTA DA neurons, but is not identical with
any of them or the property of being one.
Consequently, there is no entailment from localization state-
ments of the form ‘p is the locus of j-ing’ to identity statements of
the form ‘p ¼ j’ (Place’s assertion that ‘consciousness is a brain
process’ did not mean merely that consciousness is localizable). So
there is no good reason for either mechanists or traditional identity
theorists to take aboard this additional non-sequitur, though the
converse may hold.17
6.3. Intralevel identities: a dubious amendment
As studied by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, the
mental state or process of anhedonia in schizophrenic patients is a
phenomenon residing at a far higher set of levels than the opioid
states or processes in their ventral pallida, as studied by neuro-
pharmacologists. According to the traditional mind/brain identity
theory, a psychoneural identity statement about the relation of
anhedonic experiences and opioid states in the ventral pallida
would be an interlevel statement relating personal- and
subpersonal-level states.
Advocates of HIT were consistently clear that they, too, conceive
of heuristic identities as cross-scientiﬁc interlevel statements. For
instance, Bechtel & McCauley’s (1999: 69; 2001: 752e753)
response to the challenge of multiple realizability across species
was that articulation of the problem often neglects the issue of
‘grain’ between levels. More explicitly still, McCauley & Bechtel
(2001: 736e737) contended that HIT is expressly designed to
accommodate the multilevel character of scientiﬁc progress, and
that the heuristic identity statements they envision are ones that
concern cross-scientiﬁc interlevel relationships. They wrote:
[c]ross-scientiﬁc hypothetical identities are perfectly common
means for abetting the study of some phenomenon at multiple
levels of explanation [.] and are heuristics of discovery that
inspire multilevel programs of research. [.] The theories at
each level ascribe distinct properties to the entities and pro-
cesses that the interlevel, hypothetical identities connect.
(2001: 753)
Additionally, Looren de Jong (2006: 439) alluded to the
coupling of biophysical research on dipole generators with the
electrophysiology of event-related potentials to understand psy-
cholinguistic aspects of speech comprehension and production.
Even if allusion to this research does not improve the inductive
argument for HIT, Looren de Jong was right to note that claims
about the ‘multilevel anarchistic level-hopping’ seem empirically
adequate.
Unfortunately, themisconstrual of localization claims as identity
statements has led advocates of HIT to begin asserting that heu-
ristic identities are ultimately intralevel affairs. For instance,
Bechtel & Hamilton wrote, ‘[t]he identity theory is often construed
as advancing a reduction of psychology to neuroscience, since
neuroscience is at a lower level than psychology. From the point of
view of mechanistic explanation, [.] accounts of the part of the
system and the operation it is performing are at the same level’
(2007: 413). Burnston et al. make a similar point in the case of FFA:
pace HIT, the psychological function of face recognition is eventu-
ally decomposed into more ﬁne-grained subpersonal processes at
lower levels, and some of those subpersonal processes are them-
selves eventually attributed to speciﬁc brain areas like FFA; ‘the
identity statements that end up succeeding are intraleveldthey are
between different descriptions of phenomena at the same level of
complexity’ (2011: 113).
True, some activities do occur at the same level as some entities:
e.g., action potentials and neurons are activities and entities at the
same level. To take another example, ‘oligodendrocytes generate
myelin’ predicates the relational property of myelin-generation of
members of the class of oligodendrocytes. Generating myelin is an
intralevel affair, in part because it is a diachronic causally produc-
tive activity that occurs at the same level that oligodendrocytes
occupy. But such activities manifest the usual causal features:
asymmetry, non-synchronicity, distinctness of cause and effect, etc.
By contrast, identity is a non-causal, symmetrical, reﬂexive, syn-
chronic relation, and commonly held to be an interlevel affair.
Consequently, one of the reasons for thinking that the relevant
identities are indeed psychoneural is that they may have features
that preclude them from being intralevel.
Of course, with Burnston et al., we grant that descriptions of
neural processes may eventually be predicated of speciﬁc de-
scriptions of brain areas or parts, after many iterated rounds of
decomposing psychological functions into exceedingly ﬁne-grained
low-level subpersonal processes. But these are poor grounds for
claiming that heuristic identities are localizing intralevel predica-
tions. For one thing, the component operations of a neural mech-
anism are not picked out with psychological vocabulary (e.g.,
descriptions of myelin-generation are not highly decomposed
psychological functions). More importantly, the point of HIT was
not to posit successful or true intralevel localization statements
about highly decomposed neural phenomena and their neural ac-
tivities at the end of inquiry. Rather, identities were supposed to be
17 A common presumption is that the numerical identity of two things x and y
explains their being co-located at a time; but co-location is not sufﬁcient to infer
that x ¼ y. Moreover, recall that heuristic identities are characterized as thoroughly
hypothetical empirical statements that are disposable and probably untrue; but the
inference from truths about co-location to untrue heuristic identity statements is
invalid.
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heuristically disposable interlevel psychoneural identity state-
ments, which are made at the outset of research on the basis of
scant evidence, and which express the cross-scientiﬁc relationship
between neural phenomena and undecomposed psychological
phenomena across levels. Consequently, the treatment of localiza-
tion statements as identity statements is doubly problematic if it
leads to the claim that heuristic identities are intralevel statements
posited near the end of inquiry.
7. Back to mechanistic explanation
What the history of BRF research illuminates is exactly what
closer scrutiny of the showcase examples of visual processing,
memory encoding, and face perception also reveal: discussion of
mechanistic discovery and explanation which over-interprets
identity-talk where either there is none or none is needed, and
which bottoms out in claims about how de-/composition and
localization statements are continually reﬁned in light of new sci-
entiﬁc discoveries. What the scientiﬁc literature does not reveal is
evidence supporting HIT’s commitments to heuristic psychoneural
identity claims being posited at the outset of research and playing a
heuristic role in guiding explanatory projects. Instead, advocates of
HIT seem to be confusing identity claims for a pastiche of other
claims involving function, causal production, reduction, localiza-
tion, and property instantiation.
Whereas traditional metaphysics is often detached from the
details of scientiﬁc practicedrelying more on intuition, logic, and
conceptual analysisdnaturalized metaphysics directly serves it.
HIT may be thought of as an exemplar of naturalized meta-
physics, which delivers an empirically-grounded alternative to
the traditional identity theory in philosophy of mind. Upon ex-
amination, however, HIT illustrates adverse aspects of both.
Insufﬁcient heed is paid to the textual evidence of the actual
science, while logical, linguistic, and conceptual analysis is
underutilized. If metaphysics and science are to interact fruit-
fully, we must combine a sophisticated understanding of scien-
tiﬁc theory and practice with a metaphysician’s patience for
rariﬁed constructs and ﬁne distinctions along with their demand
for punctiliousness.
HIT masquerades as an identity theory, a misnomer at best. But
it fails to make contact with the very theory it purports to
displace, and it surrenders the competitive advantages that
identity theorists previously worked hard to establish. As Polger
observed, the idea of ‘interim’ hypothetical identities is entirely
compatible with the thought that ‘heuristic identities, in the
course of theory building, [are] replaced by more sophisticated
realization relations’ (2004: 32; see also Schouten & Looren de
Jong, 2001: 802). For his part, Polger suggested that this
compatibility implies that HIT offers no support to the identity
theory that doesn’t also apply to functionalism in philosophy of
mind. Yet, Polger’s concern generalizes beyond debates between
identity theorists and functionalists; for any theoretical solution
to the mind/body problem is compatible with the thought that
scientiﬁc research begins with disposable heuristic identities,
where ‘identity’ is understood so broadly as to mean virtually any
type of mind/body relationship.
Examples like BRF research are more than capable of demon-
strating the virtues of the mechanists’ program in this regard. For
instance, Pribram (1960: 10) presciently redescribed Olds’s ICSS
ﬁndings using a now-standard mechanistic approach, without
resorting to talk of identities, heuristic or otherwise. This is what
advocates of HIT ultimately want, anyway: evidence of mechanism
discovery and mechanistic explanation, understood in terms of
functional decomposition and localization. As for identity, that
should be left to the identity theorists.
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